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Abstract 26 
Non-human primates are capable of recalling events that occurred as long as three years ago, 27 
and are able to distinguish between similar events; akin to human memory.  In humans, 28 
distinctiveness enhances memory for events, however, it is unknown whether the same 29 
occurs in non-human primates. As such, we tested three great ape species on their ability to 30 
remember an event that varied in distinctiveness. Across three experiments, apes witnessed a 31 
baiting event in which one of three identical containers was baited with food. After a delay of 32 
two weeks, we tested their memory for the location of the baited container.  Apes failed to 33 
recall the baited container when the event was un-distinctive (Experiment 1), but were 34 
successful when it was distinctive (Experiment 2), although performance was equally good in 35 
a less-distinctive condition. A third experiment (Experiment 3) confirmed that 36 
distinctiveness, independent of reinforcement, was a consistent predictor of performance. 37 
These findings suggest that distinctiveness may enhance memory for events in non-human 38 
primates in the same way as in humans, and provides further evidence of basic similarities 39 
between the ways apes and humans remember past events. 40 
 41 
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Introduction 51 
Humans remember past events on a regular basis. Such episodic memories serve important 52 
social and instrumental functions [e.g. Pillemer, 2003]. Until recently, most research on 53 
memory of non-human primates (hereafter primates) has focused on short term memory 54 
[Menzel, 1973; Robbins and Bush, 1973; Mishkin and Delacour, 1975; Fujita and 55 
Matsuzawa, 1990; MacDonald and Agnes, 1999; Beran, Beran and Menzel, 2005; Hoffman 56 
and Beran, 2006; Inoue and Matsuzawa, 2007; Rodriguez et al. , 2011], with primate episodic 57 
memory research coming into fruition over the past decade [Menzel, 1999; Schwartz and 58 
Evans, 2001; Schwartz et al. , 2002; Schwartz, Hoffman and Evans, 2005; Hoffman, Beran 59 
and Washburn, 2009; Martin-Ordas, Haun, Colmenares and Call, 2010; Dekleva et al. , 2011; 60 
Noser and Byrne, 2015]. However, comparative studies on episodic memory have been 61 
hampered by the definition of the phenomenon [Tulving, 1972; 2001], in terms of the 62 
recollection of personal past events involving autonoetic consciousness; an awareness that the 63 
event happened to oneself. Since such awareness is hard, if not impossible, to test in animals, 64 
researchers have turned to other more objective operationalizations [see Clayton, Griffiths, 65 
Emery and Dickinson, 2001; Dere, Kart-Teke, Huston and De Souza Silva, 2006; Crystal, 66 
2009; Templer and Hampton, 2013 for reviews].   67 
Despite the progress being made here, there is still controversy over what ‘counts’ as 68 
episodic memory [Suddendorf and Busby, 2003; Suddendorf, 2007; Basile, 2015], due in part 69 
to the many stringent as well as changing criteria that arise from Tulving’s [1972; 1983; 70 
1984; 1985; 2002; 2005] definitions. In an attempt to overcome some of these conceptual 71 
problems, Rubin and Umanath [2015] recently proposed an alternative conceptualization for 72 
memory for events, which removes some of the restrictive criteria imposed by the 73 
consciousness based conception of episodic memory and enables researchers to have simpler 74 
and more measureable criteria that also can be applied to non-human animals. Rubin and 75 
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Umanath (2015) refer to memory for events as ‘event memory’, which is defined as “the 76 
mental construction of a scene, real or imagined, for the past or the future” [p.1]. Unlike 77 
episodic memory, autonoetic consciousness is not required. The only criteria required is the 78 
construction of a scene from an egocentric vantage point. As such, event memory involves 79 
fewer requirements than episodic memory, but still involves the process of remembering an 80 
event or scene, as opposed to remembering solely spatial information or knowledge.  81 
Scene construction is defined as the mental generation of a scene or event, which is 82 
achieved by binding multiple informational elements into a coherent and spatially organized 83 
representation [Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Raffard et al. , 2010; Lind, Williams, Bowler 84 
and Peel, 2014; Rubin and Umanath, 2015]. As such, to show that one’s recall is of an event 85 
memory, one needs to show evidence of scene construction, that is, the binding of 86 
information in a spatial context (hereafter contextual binding). Such contextual binding is 87 
thought to be an essential characteristic of episodic memory [Moscovitch, 1994; Chalfonte 88 
and Johnson, 1996; Raj and Bell, 2010], and it has even been argued that impairments in 89 
episodic memory, such as source memory failure, are a result of difficulties with binding 90 
stimuli or reconstructing the bound information at retrieval [Schacter, Norman and Koutstaal, 91 
1998; Schacter and Addis, 2007]. Additionally, Rubin and Umanath [2015] refer to evidence 92 
that the hippocampus is not merely responsible for spatial memory in animals but is also 93 
involved in contextual binding. For instance, damage to the hippocampus can leave spatial 94 
memory intact but lacking in detail [Winocur et al. , 2005]. As such, they argue that the 95 
function of the hippocampus in animals shares some properties with human episodic 96 
memory, and goes beyond spatial processing. Consequently, if an animal has an intact 97 
hippocampus it would likely be capable of contextual binding and, thus, event memory. 98 
Evidence of contextual binding has already been shown in primates, corvids and rats 99 
[Clayton, Yu and Dickinson, 2001; Crystal, Alford, Zhou and Hohmann, 2013; Martin-Ordas, 100 
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Berntsen and Call, 2013; Crystal and Alford, 2014; Crystal and Smith, 2014; Panoz-Brown et 101 
al. , 2016]. For instance, Martin-Ordas, Berntsen and Call [2013] showed that when exposed 102 
to various contextual information, apes were able to recall the location of a tool three years 103 
after they had witnessed it being hidden. In order to remember where the tool was hidden the 104 
apes had to bind the relevant contextual features together and ignore a number of irrelevant 105 
associative links, such as other tasks with the same experimenter, other experiments 106 
involving tool use, other tests in the same location and so forth. In this case, only by binding 107 
the relevant contextual cues were the apes able to distinguish between events that shared 108 
many of the same contextual features, and subsequently, were able to correctly recall the 109 
event in which a tool was hidden. Furthermore, in a second experiment, apes were able to 110 
distinguish between two very similar tool hiding events in order to successfully recall the 111 
location of a tool, thus providing additional evidence of binding.  Similarly, Crystal and 112 
Smith [2014] showed that rats were able to find food in a maze under conditions that required 113 
them to bind multiple disparate features, related to location, activity, and spatial cues, in 114 
order to successfully search at the relevant place. Such studies show contextual binding in 115 
action, and provide some evidence for event memory in animals.  116 
In humans, the ability to remember an event is dependent upon the interaction 117 
between encoding and retrieval. Tulving [1974] described remembering as the product of 118 
both encoding and retrieval; “we remember an event if it has left behind a trace and if 119 
something reminds us of it” [p.74]. Furthermore, not all retrieval cues are equally effective. 120 
The encoding specificity principle [Tulving and Thomson, 1973] states that a retrieval cue is 121 
only effective in so far that it was encoded with the memory trace.  122 
The effectiveness of the retrieval cue also depends on the number of memory traces to 123 
which it is associated; referred to as cue overload [Watkins and Watkins, 1975]. The more 124 
traces the cue is associated with the less likely that the cue will generate the target memory to 125 
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be recalled. Subsequently, the more distinctive the cue is the less likely it will be overloaded.  126 
Distinctiveness is defined by [Hunt and Worthen, 2006] as difference in the context of 127 
similarity, meaning that distinctive cues share fewer features with other cues that are either in 128 
the immediate context, referred to as primary distinctiveness, or that are stored in memory, 129 
referred to as secondary distinctiveness [Eysenck, 1979; Schmidt, 1991; Hunt and Worthen, 130 
2006]. A cue which shares fewer commonalities with other memory traces is less likely to 131 
become overloaded. From these two theories we can predict that successful recall of an event 132 
will be maximized when the memory trace and retrieval cue match (encoding specificity), 133 
and when the retrieval cue is distinct from other memory traces [Nairne, 2002; 2007]. These 134 
mechanisms also operate when retrieval is spontaneous and thus requires little effort 135 
[Berntsen, Staugaard and Sorensen, 2013].  136 
As with retrieval, encoding can be enhanced depending upon the type of information 137 
to be remembered.  In particular, distinctive information captures attentional resources, 138 
resulting in better encoding, regardless of reinforcement [Jenkins and Postman, 1948; 139 
Schmidt, 1991; Hunt and Worthen, 2006]. Likewise, emotion captures attentional resources 140 
in a similar manner, leading to greater memory for emotional material [Cahill and McGaugh, 141 
1995; Kensinger, 2004], often at the detriment to peripheral information [Easterbrook, 1959; 142 
Burke, Heuer and Reisberg, 1992; Schmidt, 2007; Kensinger, 2009; Nashiro and Mather, 143 
2011].  144 
 In animal research, encoding and retrieval processes have mainly been investigated in 145 
rodents and birds [see Shettleworth, 2010], with a few studies investigating the role of 146 
distinctiveness, where it has been found that distinctive items are recalled better than non-147 
distinctive items [Roberts, 1980; Zentall, Hogan, Edwards and Hearst, 1980; Reed and 148 
Richards, 1996]. With regards to primate research only a handful of studies exist that 149 
examine encoding and retrieval processes. It has been shown that memory performance is 150 
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good when the information to be encoded is relevant [Martin-Ordas, Atance and Call, 2014] 151 
and distinctive [Beran, 2011; Martin-Ordas, Berntsen and Call, 2013 experiment 2; Mendes 152 
and Call, 2014], and that emotion enhances recognition memory for pictures [Kano, Tanaka 153 
and Tomonaga, 2008], possibly due to better encoding as a result of increased attention to 154 
emotional material [Kano and Tomonaga, 2010]. Furthermore,  Kano and Hirata [2015] 155 
showed that apes are able to encode and retrieve information embedded in a distinctive event. 156 
Here, apes watched a film of an actor dressed in a King Kong suit preforming an aggressive 157 
act. The following day, when watching the same film again, the apes were able to predict 158 
what would happen next through use of anticipatory looks; i.e. they looked at the location in 159 
which King Kong would appear before he appeared. Thus, the apes retrieved the information 160 
previously encoded in anticipation of what was coming next.  161 
As these primate studies have either investigated distinctiveness over very short 162 
retention intervals [i.e. Kano, Tanaka and Tomonaga, 2008; Beran, 2011; Martin-Ordas, 163 
Atance and Call, 2014], or have not provided a control condition in which a distinctive cue is 164 
absent [i.e. Martin-Ordas, Berntsen and Call, 2013; Kano and Hirata, 2015], we still know 165 
very little about the role of distinctiveness in long term event memory. As such, the aim of 166 
the current study was to investigate the effect of distinctiveness on long term memory for 167 
simple events in great apes. 168 
 We originally began with one experiment in mind, however, additional experiments 169 
were needed to clarify the results we obtained. For ease of reading and clarity, we present the 170 
baseline Experiment first (Experiment 1), so that the reader can see the progression of a 171 
standard procedure to a distinctive procedure. The original chronological order of the 172 
Experiments was Experiment 2, Experiment 1, Experiment 3 (see table 1 for an overview of 173 
each Experiment). We refer to Rubin and Umanath’s [2015] definition of event memory, in 174 
which evidence of contextual binding is indicative of recall of a memory of an event. We also 175 
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consider an alternative memory account, associative spatial memory, in which memory 176 
performance may be a result of learning to associate a particular spatial location with a food 177 
reward. We contrast these two explanations, since the use of associative memory is a concern 178 
that is often raised when researching episodic memory in animals [see Zentall, 2006]. We 179 
predict that distinctiveness will enhance memory only in the case of contextual binding. That 180 
is, distinctiveness will only enhance memory recall if the distinctive feature(s) are bound to 181 
the target location. In the case of associative learning, we predict that only reinforcement of 182 
the target location will improve recall. In the present experiments we use the term 183 
distinctiveness to refer to secondary distinctiveness (rather than primary distinctiveness), 184 
which refers to the presence of an unusual feature(s) in comparison to features in stored 185 
memory [Eysenck, 1979; Schmidt, 1991; Hunt and Worthen, 2006]. 186 
Table 1 187 
Title:  Overview of the experimental design for the three experiments 188 
 189 
Experiment 1: Baseline 190 
The aim of this experiment was to establish a baseline level of memory performance by using 191 
a standard and undistinctive baiting procedure. We presented the apes with a platform task in 192 
which one of three containers was baited.  Previous research using a similar experimental 193 
task has shown that apes can recall the location of a baited container after 24 hours [Martin-194 
Ordas and Call, 2011], but it is unknown if they can recall for longer periods in this type of 195 
task.  As such, we chose to use a two week delay period, replicating the delay used by 196 
Martin-Ordas, Berntsen and Call [2013] who showed good recall for a distinctive hiding 197 
event after two weeks. However, we expected performance to be poorer in this task, as the 198 
platform task was not distinctive.  199 
 Additionally, we manipulated whether the experimenter identification (ID) at encoding 200 
and retrieval was matched (the same person) or non-matched (different people) and whether 201 
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the apes were reinforced or not at encoding. This manipulation aimed to help distinguish 202 
between a contextual binding account and associative learning account. If the apes’ 203 
performance is explained by event memory, then contextual binding would predict that 204 
performance in conditions in which the experimenter ID is matching will be better than 205 
conditions in which it is non-matching; if the apes bind the baited container’s location to the 206 
contextual features present at encoding, then the more of these contextual features that are 207 
present at retrieval the more likely the correct memory is to be recalled (in line with encoding 208 
specificity theory).  If performance is explained by associative learning, we would predict 209 
performance in conditions in which the apes are rewarded at encoding should be better than 210 
those which are not rewarded.   211 
 212 
Methods 213 
This research adhered to the American Society of Primatologists principles for the ethical 214 
treatment of primates, and was ethically approved by an internal committee at the Max 215 
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology and the University of St Andrews. Animal 216 
husbandry and research complies with the “EAZA Minimum Standards for the 217 
Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria”, the “EEP Bonobo Husbandry 218 
Manual”, the “WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos 219 
and Aquariums” and the “Guidelines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research 220 
and Teaching” of the Association for the Study of Animal Behavior (ASAB). The research 221 
was collected during July 2015 – February 2016 at the Wolfgang Kohler Primate Research 222 
Center at Leipzig Zoo (Leipzig, Germany).  223 
 224 
Subjects 225 
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Thirty-seven apes participated in this experiment (see table 2); 24 chimpanzees (Pan 226 
troglodytes; mean age =24 years), seven bonobos (Pan paniscus; mean age 14) and six 227 
orangutans (Pongo abelii; mean age = 19). None of the apes were food or water deprived, 228 
and all received a healthy and balanced diet during the testing period.  229 
Table 2:  230 
Title:  Subject demographics 231 
 232 
Apparatus 233 
Three opaque red containers (Length= 7cm, width = 10cm, Height =10cm) were positioned 234 
on a sliding platform roughly 16cm apart. The sliding platform was positioned in-front of a 235 
Plexiglas panel frame with three circular holes, which allowed the subjects to point at the 236 
desired container and for the experimenter to pass the food reward through (see figure 1). A 237 
plastic occluder was placed on top of the sliding platform, the experimenter baited the 238 
container behind the occluder ensuring the subject could not see which container was baited; 239 
this is a common procedure for baiting containers.  240 
 241 
Fig.1  242 
 243 
Design 244 
Apes were allocated to one of two exposure conditions; reinforced (R) or non-reinforced 245 
(NR) and one of two test conditions; matching experimenter (M), or non-matching 246 
experimenter (NM); a 2x2 between subjects’ design. Conditions were balanced in terms of 247 
age, gender and species as much as possible, this was to minimize any potential effect these 248 
variables may have on performance.  249 
 250 
Procedure 251 
 Exposure phase. 252 
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The experimenter (E) sat facing the subject behind the sliding platform. On the platform were 253 
the three red opaque containers, one to the left, center and right, respectively, roughly equal 254 
distance apart. E covered the containers with the occluder so that the subject could no longer 255 
see the containers nor E’s hands. E then baited one of the containers with one piece of banana 256 
(here-after, the baited container). The occluder was then removed, and E lifted the baited 257 
container to reveal its contents. The container was then placed back over the food, and the 258 
two empty containers were simultaneously lifted and replaced. E then pushed the platform 259 
toward the subject and waited for them to make a choice. The outcome of the choice differed 260 
depending on the condition: 261 
 Reinforced: If the subject chose the correct container, the food was revealed and given 262 
to the subject. The contents of the empty containers were then shown to the subject.  263 
 Non reinforced: If the subject chose the correct container, the food was revealed but 264 
was not given to the subject and was thrown away into an opaque bucket. The apes could see 265 
the bucket and the throwing of the food into the bucket.  The contents of the empty containers 266 
were then shown to the subject.  267 
Each subject received two trials on the same day, with one additional trial if an 268 
incorrect choice was made.  Two incorrect choices led to the subject being dropped from the 269 
study. This was to ensure that the apes understood what was required of them (to point to the 270 
baited container), and that they were paying attention and not simply picking the correct one 271 
by chance. The position of the baited container was the same in each trial and was 272 
counterbalanced between subjects.  273 
 Test phase. 274 
The test took place two weeks later (13-15 days). The experimenter ID differed depending on 275 
the condition: 276 
Matching:  The experimenter ID was the same as at exposure. 277 
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Non-matching: The experimenter ID was different to that at exposure. 278 
The procedure then followed the exposure procedure, except now E did not reveal the 279 
location of the baited container before the subject made a choice. Additionally, if the subject 280 
made a correct choice they received the food regardless of which exposure condition they 281 
were in. Subjects only received one trial. 282 
 283 
Data Analysis 284 
A correct response was defined as choosing the baited container. As there were three 285 
containers, chance was set to 0.33. We were interested in whether performance was above 286 
chance in each condition, we analyzed this for each condition separately using two tailed 287 
binomial tests. Alpha level was set to 0.05 and all analysis was conducted using R studio 288 
version 0.98.109 (as was the case for all subsequent experiments). 289 
 290 
Results 291 
All subjects required only two trials during the exposure phase, except for Daza and Ulla who 292 
failed three and were subsequently dropped from the experiment.  293 
 Binomial tests revealed that performance was not above chance in any of the 294 
conditions (figure 2); reinforced matching (binomial test: N= 10, P = 0.31), non-reinforced 295 
matching (binomial test: N= 9, P = 0.73), reinforced non-matching (binomial test: N =9, P = 296 
0.73) non-reinforced non-matching (binomial test: N = 9, P= 0.73). As performance was 297 
numerically better in the reinforced matching compared to the other three conditions (in 298 
which performance was identical), we ran an additional analysis to compare performance 299 
between the reinforced matching and the remaining three conditions pooled together. A fisher 300 
exact test revealed no significant difference (df= 1, P = 0.13), indicating that performance 301 
was not significantly better in this condition. 302 
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 303 
Fig. 2  304 
 305 
Discussion 306 
Subjects failed to recall the location of the baited container after two weeks. None of the 307 
conditions differed from each other, suggesting that reinforcement and contextual binding 308 
had little to no effect on memory performance. However, it is important to note that 309 
contextual binding may not have had an effect here due to the nature of the baiting event, that 310 
is, the event was designed to be undistinctive. The cue that we chose to manipulate was the 311 
experimenter ID. As the apes are tested by numerous experimenters, and often multiple times 312 
per day, it may be that this particular cue is overloaded. As such, the experimenter may not 313 
have been an effective cue in triggering a specific, single episode at retrieval. Additionally, 314 
the other relevant cues may also have been overloaded; the location has been used for many 315 
other tasks [e.g. Call, 2006], platform tasks have been done many other times [e.g. Call, 316 
2004], and similar containers have been used in other tasks [e.g. Call, 2006], thus, even if 317 
contextual binding took place, there was nothing distinctive about the bound representation to 318 
lead to the recall of this specific baiting event. This is consistent with Eysenck’s theory of 319 
distinctiveness [Eysenck, 1979], in which “performance is assumed to depend far more on 320 
distinctive than non-distinctive overlap” [ p.94]. As such, the failure to recall the baited 321 
location is not necessarily a result of a failure of contextual binding, but rather a lack of 322 
distinct or diagnostic information in the bound representation to retrieve a specific memory, 323 
resulting in the recall of a ‘gist’ like memory [Schacter, Norman and Koutstaal, 1998; 324 
Schacter and Addis, 2007]. 325 
 With regards to the associative account, it may be that the reinforcement was not great 326 
enough to influence performance. As the apes only received one piece of banana per trial, and 327 
only two trials during the exposure phase, this may not have been a large enough 328 
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reinforcement to learn the association between the food and the spatial location of the 329 
container after a long delay. During training, when a delay period was not implemented, the 330 
apes were successful at choosing the correct container (except for two subjects who were not 331 
included in the analysis), thus they were able to learn where the food was, but failed to recall 332 
the information after a long delay. 333 
 334 
Experiment 2: Distinctiveness 335 
Experiment 1 revealed that the apes failed to remember the location of the baited container 336 
after two weeks, as such the aim of this experiment was to improve memory performance by 337 
making the event more distinctive. This was achieved by baiting the container outside the 338 
testing room and by increasing the amount of banana. Both manipulations are very rare, if not 339 
completely novel, in our lab for this type of task, and thus are distinctive in comparison to 340 
standard baiting tasks.  341 
Additionally, we further investigated the impact of distinctiveness by including a 342 
surprising feature in one condition and not in another; a facial mask worn by the 343 
experimenter depicting the face of the apes’ keeper. Four different masks were used, one for 344 
each species. The masks were made using high quality head-shots of four of the keepers; a 345 
bonobo keeper, an orangutan keeper and two chimpanzee keepers (the chimpanzees were 346 
housed in two separate groups and thus had separate keepers). Previous research has shown 347 
that apes are capable of recognizing human faces in the form of 2D photographic images 348 
[Tomonaga, 1999; Martin-Malivel and Okada, 2007; Sliwa, Duhamel, Pascalis and Wirth, 349 
2011]. Thus, a photographic mask depicting the keepers face should be recognizable to the 350 
apes. The apes only saw the mask of their own keeper; for example, bonobos only saw the 351 
mask of the bonobo keeper. We chose to use masks of the keepers for two reasons. Firstly, 352 
we wanted to surprise the apes. The apes are very familiar with their keepers and thus should 353 
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be surprised when they see the keeper’s face on the body of a person that is not their keeper.  354 
Furthermore, it is likely they will also recognise the keeper by sound in addition to sight [e.g. 355 
see Martinez and Matsuzawa, 2009], thus, the configuration of the keeper’s facial features 356 
with the body and voice of another experimenter should be surprising. Secondly, although we 357 
wanted to surprise the apes, we did not want to frighten them. Using faces of familiar keepers 358 
should not be frightening to the apes.  359 
If the apes’ performance is explained by event memory, then contextual binding 360 
would predict better memory recall in this experiment as opposed to Experiment 1, and better 361 
recall performance in the more distinctive mask condition than the non-mask condition. 362 
Likewise, if the apes’ performance is due to associative learning this would also predict better 363 
performance in this experiment as opposed to Experiment 1; this is because the food reward 364 
(amount of banana) is larger, thus strengthening the reinforcement. However, this account 365 
would predict no difference between the mask and no mask condition, as the reinforcement 366 
value does not differ. 367 
 368 
Methods 369 
Subjects  370 
The same subjects from Experiment 1 participated here, with the exception of (Kuno, Swela, 371 
Natascha, Bimbo) and the addition of (Joey, Daza, Ulla, Robert, Frederike), resulting in a 372 
total of thirty apes (see table 2); Nineteen chimpanzees (mean age = 26.8), four orangutans 373 
(mean age = 18) and seven bonobos (mean age = 16).  374 
 375 
Apparatus 376 
The apparatus and set-up was the same as Experiment 1, except the red opaque containers 377 
were replaced with blue opaque containers, measuring the same dimensions (see figure 1). 378 
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The reason we replaced the containers was to minimize proactive interference [Anderson and 379 
Neely, 1996]. Additionally, a tray was included on which the containers were placed (see 380 
figure 1), and a cardboard laminated mask was present for half of the subjects. There were 381 
four masks, depicting a colour photograph of each keeper associated with each species (with 382 
two keepers for the chimpanzees). Each species only saw the mask of their keeper. The mask 383 
covered the entire face of the experimenter, except for the eyes. 384 
 385 
Design 386 
The apes were allocated to one of two conditions; mask (two orang-utans, four bonobos and 387 
nine chimpanzees, age range 10-41 years, mean 22 years) no-mask (three bonobos, two 388 
orang-utans, ten chimpanzees, age range 7-49 years, mean 23 years).  389 
 390 
Procedure 391 
Exposure phase. 392 
Mask condition. 393 
The three blue containers were positioned on the tray, one to the left, one to the center and 394 
one to the right. Half a sliced banana was placed under one of the containers outside of the 395 
testing room and out of sight of the subject. The experimenter (E), wearing the mask of the 396 
keeper, entered the testing room carrying the tray and placed it onto the sliding platform. E, 397 
sat facing the subject behind the sliding platform, called the subject’s name and made eye 398 
contact with them (ensuring the subject looked at the mask). E then lifted up the baited 399 
container so that the banana was visible, and replaced it again once the subject had seen it. E 400 
then simultaneously lifted up the remaining two containers, and replaced them once the 401 
subject had seen that there was no banana there. 402 
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E then pushed the sliding platform towards the subject and waited for them to make a 403 
choice (by pointing/reaching through one of the holes). If the subject chose the baited 404 
container (correct choice) they received the banana, and the two empty containers were lifted 405 
to show the subject that they were empty. If the subject chose one of the empty containers, 406 
the container was lifted, then the remaining two containers were lifted to reveal their 407 
contents. No banana was received in this case. Each subject received two trials; if an 408 
incorrect choice was made, they received one additional trial.  If the subject chose incorrectly 409 
in two trials, they were dropped from the experiment. The position of the baited container 410 
was the same in each trial and was different to Experiment 1 (to minimize interference). The 411 
location of the baited container was counterbalanced between subjects.  412 
No-mask condition. 413 
The no-mask condition was identical to the mask condition, except that E did not wear a 414 
mask of the keeper. 415 
Test phase 416 
The test took place two weeks (13-17 days) later.  Following the same procedure as before, 417 
and in the same testing room, E baited one of the containers (the same one previously baited) 418 
and the subject made a choice.  Crucially, E did not reveal the location of the banana to the 419 
subject before they made a choice. Subjects from the mask condition saw E wearing the same 420 
mask as they saw previously. Subjects from the no-mask condition saw E wearing no mask. 421 
All subjects received only one trial.  422 
 423 
Data analysis 424 
The data were analysed in the same way as Experiment 1. In addition, to see if performance 425 
was better than in Experiment 1, we compared overall performance in Experiment 1 to 426 
overall performance in Experiment 2 using a two (response) by two (Experiment) Fisher 427 
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exact test. 428 
 429 
Results 430 
All subjects required only two trials during the exposure. As we were interested in whether 431 
the apes remembered the baited container significantly above chance, we compared the 432 
number of correct choices per condition to chance (exact binomial, two tailed). Both the 433 
mask (binomial test: N=15, P = 0.05) and no-mask condition (binomial test: N=15,  P < 434 
0.001) were significantly above chance, and were not different to each other (Fisher exact 435 
test: df= 1, P = 0.4) (see figure 3). Thus, subjects in both conditions were able to correctly 436 
recall the baited location from two weeks previously, with neither condition showing better 437 
performance than the other. Additionally, performance was better than Experiment 1 (Fisher 438 
exact test: df=1 P = 0.004). 439 
Fig. 3 440 
 441 
Discussion 442 
The results indicate that subjects were able to recall the location of the baited container after 443 
a delay of two weeks. Additionally, performance was extremely high across conditions. This 444 
was somewhat surprising given the difficulty of the task; the apes had to distinguish this task 445 
from many similar tasks [e.g. Call, 2004], to distinguish these containers from other similar 446 
containers [e.g. Call, 2006], and also to recall the exact location of the baited container in an 447 
array in which the containers were extremely close together (see figure 1). These findings add 448 
to existing evidence that apes are capable of remembering past encounters over long time 449 
intervals [ e.g. Martin-Ordas, Berntsen and Call, 2013] 450 
 The better performance in comparison to Experiment 1 supports both contextual 451 
binding and associative learning. With regards to contextual binding, none of the cues were 452 
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distinctive in Experiment 1 (the task, experimenter, location and baiting procedure were 453 
common to many other tasks), even the loss of small amount of food upon a correct choice 454 
had occurred before to the same apes [e.g. Vlamings, Uher and Call, 2006; Uher and Call, 455 
2008], making it difficult to distinguish between similar memories even when bound 456 
[Schacter, Norman and Koutstaal, 1998; Schacter and Addis, 2007]. Conversely, in the 457 
current experiment, the baiting procedure and food amount were distinctive in both 458 
conditions, and when bound to the other features (e.g. experimenter, room, baited container) 459 
may have led to a distinctive, un-overloaded [i.e Watkins and Watkins, 1975; Rubin, 1995] 460 
and highly specific (i.e. encoding specificity) cue at retrieval, facilitating successful recall. 461 
This interpretation would be consistent with the findings from Martin-Ordas, Berntsen and 462 
Call [2013]. In the case of the associative learning, the better performance can be explained 463 
by the larger reinforcement (larger food reward) strengthening the association between the 464 
baited container’s location and the presence of a food reward.  465 
  Performance between the two conditions did not differ, which is supportive of the 466 
associative learning account, given that reinforcement value was the same in both conditions. 467 
However, it is not in support of contextual binding, in which performance should have been 468 
better in the mask condition; the more distinctive features that are bound the more unique and 469 
specific the retrieval cue becomes, and thus, the more effective it is at recalling the correct 470 
memory. However, there are multiple reasons why this may not have been the case. Firstly, 471 
as performance was high in both conditions, it may be that any potential enhancement of an 472 
additional distinctive feature was not seen, although this seems unlikely as performance was 473 
better (but not significantly) in the no-mask condition.  Secondly, the mask was intended to 474 
elicit surprise, and indeed, a number of individuals produced a physical reaction to the mask 475 
(prolonged looking, wariness, aggression). In both the human and animal literature emotion 476 
enhances memory, however, the effect seems to be a focal one; memory for the emotional 477 
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material is enhanced at the cost of peripheral material [Easterbrook, 1959; Burke, Heuer and 478 
Reisberg, 1992; Schmidt and Saari, 2007; Kensinger, 2009]. In this case the mask may have 479 
captured attention, resulting in less attentional resources to encode other information, such as 480 
the experimenter, the location and the baited container. Similarly, the same effect has been 481 
found for distinctive material, that is, that distinctive items are recalled at the expense of 482 
peripheral non-distinctive items [Ellis et al. , 1971; Schulz, 1971]; [but see Schmidt, 1985]. 483 
 484 
Experiment 3: Reinforcement and distinctiveness 485 
Performance was better in Experiment 2 compared with Experiment 1. However, it is less 486 
clear whether the better performance can be attributed to the larger reinforcement (associative 487 
learning) or by distinctiveness (contextual binding). As such, Experiment 3 aimed to 488 
distinguish between the two accounts.  First, to investigate whether distinctiveness could 489 
account for the better memory performance, we kept the food amount the same as in 490 
Experiment 2, but changed the baiting procedure to the traditional method used in 491 
Experiment 1. Thus, the difference between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 became one of 492 
distinctiveness, in which Experiment 3 was less distinctive due to the use of a standard 493 
baiting procedure and the large amount of food no-longer being distinctive. The large food 494 
amount was no longer distinctive because it occurred in Experiment 2, and thus the apes now 495 
had experience of receiving large food amounts in this type of task. To assess whether 496 
reinforcement influenced performance, we included a reinforced and non-reinforced 497 
condition (as with Experiment 1). Therefore, if the performance from Experiment 2 was a 498 
result of the larger food amount (reinforcement) we should see poorer performance in 499 
Experiment 3 in the non-reinforced compared with the reinforced condition. In short, 500 
Experiment 3 differed from Experiment 2 in terms of being less distinctive and included a 501 
non-reinforced condition. It remained the same in terms of the amount of food used. 502 
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 If the apes use contextual binding then performance in both conditions should be 503 
poorer than in Experiment 2, due to a lack of distinctive cues. If the apes use associative 504 
learning, then performance in the reinforced condition should be comparable to Experiment 2 505 
(as the reinforcement value is the same), and better than the non-reinforced condition. 506 
 507 
Methods 508 
Subjects 509 
All subjects from Experiment 2 took part in this experiment, with the exception of Kara, 510 
Annett, Ulla, Riet and Dokana. In addition, four extra apes took part (Bimbo, Suaq, Natascha 511 
and Kuno), resulting in 29 apes (see table 2); 16 chimpanzees (mean age =27.1 years), eight 512 
bonobos (mean age= 20) and five orangutans (mean age =17). 513 
 514 
Apparatus 515 
The same apparatus from Experiment 1 was used in this experiment, except that the blue 516 
containers were replaced with green ones (Length = 13 cm, Width = 7 cm, Height = 6 cm) to 517 
minimize potential interference from the previous studies.  518 
 519 
Design 520 
Apes were allocated to one of two exposure conditions; reinforced (R) or non-reinforced 521 
(NR). In most cases, subjects were assigned to the opposite condition they received in 522 
Experiment 1; that is, reinforced to non-reinforced. Conditions were balanced in terms of age, 523 
gender and species as much as possible. 524 
 525 
Procedure 526 
Exposure phase. 527 
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The procedure was identical to the exposure procedure from Experiment 1, with the 528 
exception that the amount of banana under the baited container was larger (half a banana); the 529 
same amount as in Experiment 2. The position of the baited container was the same in each 530 
trial, but different from the previous two experiments. 531 
Test phase. 532 
The test took place two weeks (13-14 days) later.  The procedure was the same as the 533 
exposure procedure, except that E did not reveal the location of the baited container before 534 
the subject made a choice. Additionally, if the subject made a correct choice they received the 535 
food regardless of which exposure condition they were in. Subjects only received one trial. 536 
 537 
Data analysis 538 
The data were analysed in the same way as the previous two Experiments. Additionally, we 539 
compared whether performance in the R condition was the same as performance in 540 
Experiment 2 (conditions from Experiment 2 were pooled due to not being statistically 541 
different) using a 2 (Experiment 2, R) by 2 (response) Fisher exact test. We also compared 542 
performance in the NR condition to Experiment 2; 2 (Experiment 2, NR) by 2 (response) 543 
Fisher exact text. 544 
 545 
Results 546 
All subjects required only two trials during the exposure procedure, except for Frederike who 547 
required three. Performance was above chance in the NR condition (binomial test: N=15, P = 548 
0.05) but not in the R condition (binomial test: N=14, P = 0.78), thus, subjects remembered 549 
the baited location in the NR but not the R condition (see figure 4). With regards to 550 
performance between this Experiment and Experiment 2, performance in the R condition was 551 
worse (Fisher exact test: df=1, P = 0.05) and not significantly different in the NR condition 552 
(Fisher exact test: df=1, P = 0.52). 553 
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 554 
Fig. 4  555 
 556 
Discussion 557 
Apes only successfully recalled the location of the baited container when they were not 558 
reinforced during the initial exposure phase. This is surprising as it goes against any law of 559 
reinforcement, strongly contradicting an associative learning account.  560 
 With regards to contextual binding, such results appear to be un-supportive. However, 561 
it may be that our original prediction was misguided; as with baiting the container outside the 562 
testing room, ‘throwing’ away a large amount of food is not a common occurrence, and is 563 
therefore distinctive (different in comparison to the standard procedure). The crucial 564 
difference between the throwing away of food in Experiment 1 and this experiment is the 565 
amount of food that was thrown away. As the apes rarely receive such large food amounts, it 566 
is highly unlikely they have experienced such a large amount being thrown away. In contrast, 567 
they have had experience of small amounts being discarded, such as in reverse contingency 568 
tasks [Vlamings, Uher and Call, 2006; Uher and Call, 2008]. Thus, even though we did not 569 
intend to include a distinctive feature to the event, the act of throwing away a large amount of 570 
food may have been distinctive, resulting in enhanced performance. Indeed, the finding that 571 
performance in this condition was comparable to performance in Experiment 2 suggests that 572 
distinctiveness may be the common explanatory variable.   573 
 Such a finding is consistent with distinctiveness effects in human memory, in which 574 
distinctiveness enhances memory regardless of reinforcement [Hunt and Worthen, 2006; 575 
Guitart-Masip et al. , 2010]. Furthermore, research with primates suggests that a novel 576 
stimulus attracts attention even when it is associated with a negative outcome [Foley, 577 
Jangraw, Peck and Gottlieb, 2014], which is consistent with our finding that a novel event 578 
leads to memory enhancement even when the event is negative. In the human literature, this 579 
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effect is referred to as an “attention magnet” [Laney, Campbell, Heuer and Reisberg, 2004], 580 
in which negatively arousing stimuli capture attention and subsequently are remembered very 581 
well.  582 
 However, it could be argued that the difference between the conditions is simply a 583 
result of whether food was received or not at encoding. We believe this is not the case for two 584 
reasons. Firstly, if we explain the performance by the giving or not giving of food before the 585 
test, then the results from Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 should differ; they should perform 586 
above chance when they did not receive food (as we see here in the NR condition), but not 587 
when they receive the food, this is not what we see in Experiment 2. Secondly, performance 588 
in the NR condition of Experiment 1 was at chance, whereas in this experiment it was above 589 
chance. Therefore, the common explanatory variable cannot be the receiving or not receiving 590 
of food at encoding.   591 
 An alternative explanation for the good performance in the NR condition here could 592 
be the role of experience. At the time of this experiment the apes had already been tested on 593 
two very similar tasks (i.e. Experiments 1 and 2), both with a two-week retention period. As 594 
such, the apes may have anticipated that they would be tested on the location of the baited 595 
container. However, if this were the case then performance in the R condition should also be 596 
good, yet here they perform at chance. Furthermore, if the apes are simply learning that they 597 
will be tested after a delay, performance should be as good, if not better than, the first 598 
experiment they received (Experiment 2), which is not the case for the R condition. 599 
  The finding that performance in the R condition was poorer than in Experiment 2 is 600 
supportive of contextual binding. The R condition had no distinctive features; although the 601 
large food amount was distinctive in Experiment 2, here it was no longer distinctive due to 602 
the very fact it had recently occurred in Experiment 2. That is, a large food amount was no 603 
longer novel to the apes due to past experience of large food amounts in this type of task. 604 
Lewis 
 
 
25 
Thus, just like Experiment 1, contextual binding may not have led to successful recall due to 605 
lack of distinct information in the bound representation, resulting in ‘gist’ like memory rather 606 
than recall of the specific event [Schacter, Norman and Koutstaal, 1998; Schacter and Addis, 607 
2007]. In contrast, this finding contradicts associative learning, in which performance should 608 
increase as reinforcement value increases; here the condition with the high reward (R 609 
condition) was at chance, whereas the condition with no reward (NR) was above chance. 610 
Additionally, performance in the R condition was poorer than in Experiment 2, even though 611 
the reinforcement amount was identical. Such results strongly contradict an associative 612 
memory account. 613 
 614 
General Discussion 615 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of distinctiveness on long-term 616 
event memory in great apes. In order to address the common concern that animals may use 617 
associative memory to recall information, we generated differing predictions based on two 618 
accounts; event memory, as shown by contextual binding, and associative memory.  619 
 Experiment 1 used a standard baiting procedure in which the apes were rewarded with 620 
a regular amount of food for a correct choice. This baseline experiment allowed for us to 621 
assess whether apes could recall an event that occurred only twice after a two-week delay, 622 
using a standard and undistinctive procedure. Additionally, we assessed whether performance 623 
could be hindered or enhanced from this baseline by manipulating reinforcement and by 624 
matching contextual features at encoding and retrieval. The results indicated that the apes 625 
failed to remember the location of the baited container in any of the conditions, suggesting 626 
that neither associative learning nor contextual binding had an effect on memory 627 
performance. However, the poor performance could be explained by both the cues being 628 
overloaded and undistinctive, resulting in binding having no beneficial effect, and by the 629 
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reinforcement value being too small for associative learning to occur and be retained over a 630 
two-week delay. 631 
 An alternative explanation could be that the apes simply did not assume that the same 632 
container would be baited after a two-week delay. As the apes are tested on many similar 633 
tasks, which are often unrelated to one another, the apes’ experimental history may 634 
predispose them to assume that tasks separated in time are not related to one another. 635 
However, we believe this is not the case for two reasons. Firstly, the apes successfully 636 
assumed that food was in the same location in Experiments 2 and 3, as shown by selecting 637 
the correct container above chance. Secondly, previous research from our lab using a similar 638 
design has shown that apes can successfully select the location of a container baited 24 hours 639 
previously [Martin-Ordas and Call, 2011]. Instead, we believe that the lack of any distinctive 640 
diagnostic cues made it very difficult for the apes to distinguish between one platform baiting 641 
experiment and another. That is to say, the apes did not fail to assume they should look in the 642 
location in which the food was hidden last, rather, that they did not have enough distinctive 643 
diagnostic information to correctly recall where it was hidden last.    644 
  In Experiment 2 we showed that by making elements of the event distinctive and by 645 
increasing the reinforcement value (larger amount of food), performance could be greatly 646 
enhanced. However, it was unclear as to whether distinctiveness (contextual binding) or 647 
reinforcement (associative learning) accounted for the improved performance. Experiment 3 648 
aimed to distinguish between the two accounts. We found that by using the standard baiting 649 
procedure (removing distinctiveness) and using a large food reward (high reinforcement), 650 
performance was at chance, contradicting associative learning. When the apes were not 651 
reinforced for a correct choice and a large amount of food was thrown away (a distinctive 652 
event), performance was again comparable to Experiment 2, providing support for contextual 653 
binding and strongly contradicting associative learning.  654 
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 The results from Experiment 3 show that memory performance was enhanced for 655 
distinctive events, irrespective of reinforcement, thus showing commonalities with human 656 
memory [Hunt and Worthen, 2006]. Such a finding is consistent with contextual binding; by 657 
binding distinct and specific features to the baited container’s location, the apes could 658 
distinguish between other highly similar baiting events. The more distinctive the event, the 659 
more unique this bound representation became, and thus, the more likely the correct memory 660 
was recalled. In contrast, associative learning would not make use of distinctive material in 661 
the same way, indeed, associative learning would only improve as the strength of the 662 
association increases, which here was manipulated by increasing the amount of food that was 663 
baited in the location.  664 
 One could argue that a contextual binding account would predict enhanced 665 
performance in conditions in which encoding and retrieval cues are highly matched (i.e. 666 
encoding specificity), contradicting our findings in Experiment 1. However, this ignores the 667 
importance of the cue-overload theory, in which a cue is only effective if it is not associated 668 
to many memory traces [Watkins and Watkins, 1975]. In Experiment 1, all the cues were 669 
common and un-distinctive, and thus highly overloaded. Even when bound, the combination 670 
of cues was still not distinct and specific enough to generate a specific memory [e.g. see 671 
Eysenck, 1979], and more likely to result in the recall of a gist memory [e.g. Schacter, 672 
Norman and Koutstaal, 1998; Schacter and Addis, 2007]. Thus, when taking account of both 673 
the encoding specificity and cue overload theories, a contextual binding account is consistent 674 
with the results from all three experiments.  675 
 Although our findings are more consistent with a distinctiveness effect, as opposed to 676 
associative learning by reinforcement, we acknowledge that we cannot rule out other 677 
alternative explanations. The distinctiveness account does not always directly follow from 678 
our data, for instance, a distinctiveness account would predict enhanced performance for the 679 
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mask condition in Experiment 2, and better performance in the matching condition compared 680 
to the non-matching condition of Experiment 1. However, we believe that when accounting 681 
for other well-known memory conceptions, such as cue-overload in Experiment 1 and 682 
attention magnets in Experiment 2, our data remain consistent with a distinctiveness account. 683 
Thus, although there may be other viable explanations, we favor a distinctiveness account.  684 
  In addition to the findings on distinctiveness and contextual binding, surprise may 685 
also have had an effect in Experiments 2 and 3. In Experiment 2, the element of surprise may 686 
have led to attention being focused on the surprising element (the mask) and consequently 687 
drawn away from the peripheral elements, including baiting of the container. This focusing of 688 
attention at the detriment to peripheral information occurs in human memory [Easterbrook, 689 
1959; Burke, Heuer and Reisberg, 1992; Schmidt, 2007; Kensinger, 2009] and shares 690 
parallels with divided attention which has been shown in rodents [Zentall, 1985]. With 691 
regards to Experiment 3, the throwing away of a large amount of food upon a correct choice 692 
may also have been surprising due to its unexpectedness. But here, and unlike the mask in 693 
Experiment 2, the location of the baited container is the focal point, as it is the baited 694 
container from which the food is thrown away. Thus, the location of the baited container may 695 
benefit from additional attention and thus be remembered to a greater extent than containers 696 
with no surprising element.  Indeed, this result is consistent with the von-Restorff effect [von 697 
Restorff, 1933], in which an item that is different (isolated) from a series of similar items is 698 
remembered better than other items. In this situation, the surprising container is remembered 699 
better than the non-surprising containers. However, as we did not collect data on emotional 700 
responses, such as surprise, we can only speculate on this. 701 
 According to Rubin and Umanath [2015] definition of event memory, a memory of a 702 
past event requires mentally reconstructing a scene, with scene construction defined as the 703 
ability to bind various informational features into a coherently organized spatial 704 
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representation  [Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Raffard et al. , 2010; Lind, Williams, Bowler 705 
and Peel, 2014; Rubin and Umanath, 2015]. The reconstruction of a scene can occur 706 
voluntary or involuntary and can be of a single episode or multiple events. Our results are 707 
consistent with this; the apes were able to successfully recall the spatial location of one of 708 
three identical containers only when distinctive features were present, suggesting that these 709 
distinctive features were bound to the specific spatial location of the container. Although are 710 
findings are consistent with binding, we acknowledge that mechanisms other than binding 711 
may have been at work, and as such further research is needed to clarify these underlying 712 
mechanisms. Performance was not predicted by the amount of reinforcement (food reward), 713 
and thus strongly contradicts an associative learning account.  714 
 715 
Summary 716 
Our results suggest that great apes can bind distinctive information to spatial locations in 717 
order to distinguish between very similar events, providing evidence of event memory in apes 718 
[as defined by Rubin and Umanath, 2015]. These results add to the growing literature on 719 
contextual binding in animals [Clayton, Yu and Dickinson, 2001; Crystal, Alford, Zhou and 720 
Hohmann, 2013; Martin-Ordas, Berntsen and Call, 2013; Crystal and Smith, 2014], and 721 
shows parallels with human memory, in which distinctiveness enhances memory for events 722 
independent of reinforcement [Hunt and Worthen, 2006].  723 
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 Table 1: Variables included in each of the three experiments. Empty cells indicate that the variable in question 
was not included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment Condition No. 
Subjects 
Distinctive 
baiting 
procedure 
Large 
food 
amount 
Non-
reinforced 
Matching 
Experimenter 
Mask 
1 
 
Reinforced 
Matching 
10       
Non-reinforced 
Matching 
9        
Reinforced 
Non-Matching 
9      
Non-reinforced 
Non-matching 
9       
2 
 
Mask 
 
15          
No mask 
 
15         
3 Reinforced 
 
14        
Non-reinforced 15         
 Table 2: Age (at time of Experiment 1), sex, species and tasks participated in for each subject. 
 
Subject Species Age (years) Sex Tasks 
participated in 
Fimi Bonobo 7 Female 1,2,3 
Gemena Bonobo 9 Female 1,2,3 
Luiza Bonobo 10 Female 1,2,3 
Lexi Bonobo 15 Female 1,2,3 
Yasa Bonobo 17 Female 1,2,3 
Kuno Bonobo 19 Male 1,3 
Jasango Bonobo 24 Male 1,2,3 
Joey Bonobo 32 Male 2,3 
Bangolo Chimpanzee 7 Male 1 
Kara Chimpanzee 10 Female 1,2 
Lobo Chimpanzee 11 Male 1,2,3 
Kofi Chimpanzee 11 Male 1 
Tai Chimpanzee 12 Female 1,2,3 
Kisha Chimpanzee 12 Female 1 
Lome Chimpanzee 13 Male 1,2,3 
Alex Chimpanzee 14 Male 1,2,3 
Alexandra Chimpanzee 15 Female 1,2,3 
Annett Chimpanzee 15 Female 1,2 
Bambari Chimpanzee 16 Female 1 
Swela Chimpanzee 20 Female 1 
Frodo Chimpanzee 21 Male 1,2,3 
Sandra Chimpanzee 22 Female 1,2,3 
Jahaga Chimpanzee 22 Female 1,2,3 
Hope Chimpanzee 26 Female 1 
Daza Chimpanzee 29 Female 2,3 
Dorien Chimpanzee 34 Female 1,2,3 
Natascha Chimpanzee 35 Female 1,3 
Riet Chimpanzee 37 Female 1,2,3 
Corrie Chimpanzee 38 Female 1,2,3 
Ulla Chimpanzee 38 Female 2 
Fraukje Chimpanzee 39 Female 1,2,3 
Robert Chimpanzee 39 Male 1,2,3 
Frederike Chimpanzee 41 Female 1,2,3 
Jeudi Chimpanzee 49 Female 1,2,3 
Suaq Orangutan 6 Male 1,3 
Raja Orangutan 11 Female 1,2,3 
Pini Orangutan 17 Female 1,2,3 
Padana Orangutan 19 Female 1,2,3 
Dokana Orangutan 26 Female 1,2 
Bimbo Orangutan 34 Male 1,3 
  
 
 
Fig.1. Set-up of the apparatus in Experiment 2. In Experiments 1 and 3 the tray on which the containers are  
on was not used (only the sliding platform that the tray is on) and an occluder was used 
 
 
 
 
fig. 2: Number of correct subjects by condition. R-M = reinforced matching, NR-M = non-reinforced  
matching, R-NM = reinforced non-matching, NR-NM = non-reinforced non-matching. Chance shows 
number of subjects that would be correct if performing at chance.  
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fig. 3 Number of correct subjects by each condition, chance shows number of subjects that would be 
correct if performing at chance. *= 0.05 **=<0.001.  
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fig.4 Number of correct subjects by condition, chance shows number of subjects that would be correct if 
performing at chance. * = 0.05  
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